

## Message Text

PAGE 01 VIENNA 09894 01 OF 03 301458Z

53

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04

AEC-11 AECE-00 OMB-01 INRE-00 DRC-01 /149 W

----- 126030

O 301340Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 785

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 9894

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AGREED AD HOC REPORT ON THE PROGRESS  
OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO NATO SITCEN:

NATO SITCEN PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE URGENTLY TO SECGEN,  
INTERNATIONAL STAFF, ATTENTION MR. HAAS, CHMILCOM AND SACEUR.  
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION TO PERMREPS AND IMMEDIATE RETRANSMISSION  
NATOWIDE TO CAPITALS (PASS TO MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
AND DEFENSE) REQUESTED.

NATO SECRET FOR NATO ADDRESSEES REPEAT NATO SECRET

SUBJECT: AGREED AD HOC GROUP REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF MBFR  
NEGOTIATIONS

FROM CHAIRMAN AD HOC GROUP VIENNA FOR SECRETARY GENERAL NATO  
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AGREED AD HOC GROUP REPORT ON THE PROGRESS  
SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 09894 01 OF 03 301458Z

OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WAS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP ON  
30 NOVEMBER:

MAIN ISSUES

1. THE ACCOUNT OF THE PROGRESS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS  
(PARAGRAPHS 2-8) AND THEIR EVALUATION (PARAGRAPHS 9-15)  
HIGHLIGHT THE FOLLOWING MAJOR ISSUES ON WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS  
ARE LIKELY TO FOCUS DURING THE NEXT STAGE:

A. ASSOCIATED MEASURES: THE EASTERN SIDE IS RELUCTANT TO  
ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES. THE WEST'S  
POSITION WILL NOT BE COMPLETE UNTIL THE ALLIANCE HAS REACHED  
AGREEMENT ON THE ENVISAGED PROPOSALS CONCERNING:

--PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES; (PARA.

23 OF CM (73)83)

--AND STABILIZING MEASURES, INCLUDING NON-CIRCUMVEN-  
TION AND VERIFICATION. (PARAS. 29-33 OF CM (73)

83)

B. FORCES TO BE REDUCED:

(I) IN CONTRAST TO NATO, THE EAST PROPOSALS TO REDUCE  
FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM THE OUTSET;

(II) IN CONTRAST TO NATO, THE EAST PROPOSES THE  
INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES.

C. PHASING: ALTHOUGH PROVIDING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF  
REDUCTIONS IN STAGES, THE EAST PROPOSES ONLY ONE NEGOTIA-  
TING PHASE WHEREAS THE WEST PROPOSES TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES  
OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE EASTERN SIDE WILL SEEK A CLEAR DEFINI-  
TION OF HOW THE ALLIES SEE THE LINK IN SUBSTANCE AND TIMING  
BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES IN THE WESTERN PROPOSALS.

D. OVERALL COMMON CEILING: WHILE NATO SEEKS TO ESTABLISH  
A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES, THE EAST MAINTAINS  
THAT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA MUST  
BE PRESERVED EVEN AT A LOWER LEVEL.

E. EUROPEAN RESERVATION: THE EASTERN SIDE HAS BEEN PARTI-  
CULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT WESTERN STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT  
THAT NOTHING IN MBFR SHOULD INHIBIT THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT  
SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 09894 01 OF 03 301458Z

OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. EASTERN DESIRE TO DO PRECISELY  
THIS SEEMS REFLECTED BY THE DESIRE TO ENSURE INCLUSION OF  
WEST EUROPEAN FORCES IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET, AND  
TO NEGOTIATE SEPARATE NATIONAL CEILINGS ON REDUCED FORCES.

AD HOC GROUP REPORT ON MBFR NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH 30 NOVEMBER 1973

2. THE AD HOC GROUP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THIRTEEN ALLIED  
STATES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AND OF THE NATO MILITARY  
AUTHORITIES, CONVENED IN VIENNA ON 16 OCTOBER TO COMPLETE  
PREPARATIONS FOR THE 30 OCTOBER OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON  
THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED  
MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. FROM 16 TO 29 OCTOBER, THE ALLIED

REPRESENTATIVES REVIEWED OPENING STATEMENTS AND AGREED ON PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF AD HOC GROUP BUSINESS. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES DECIDED TO PROPOSE TO THE EAST THAT, FOR THE FIRST FEW WEEKS FOLLOWING PRESENTATION OF OPENING SPEECHES ON 30 AND 31 OCTOBER, PLENARY SESSIONS BE SCHEDULED INITIALLY TWICE A WEEK ON TUESDAY AND THURSDAY MORNINGS. THE EASTERN SIDE, ALTHOUGH QUESTIONING THE NEED FOR

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 09894 02 OF 03 301452Z

53

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00 OMB-01 DRC-01 /149 W

----- 125987

O 301340Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO USMISSION NATO BRUSSEL IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 786

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 VIENNA 9894

FROM US REP MBFR

SO MANY PLENARY SESSIONS, ACCEPTED THE SCHEDULE AS THE INITIAL ARRANGEMENT. TO KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED ON THE WORK OF THE AD HOC GROUP AND ON THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE CHIRMAN PROPARES A REPORT AT THE END OF EACH WEEK TO ACT AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE SCHEDULED ORAL REPORTS TO THE COUNCIL EVERY THIRD WEEK.

OPENING SPEECHES

3. NEGOTIATIONS OPENED AS SCHEDULED ON 30 OCTOBER AND HAVE CONTINUED GENERALLY IN A GOOD BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE. WESTERN OPENING SPEECHES OUTLINED THE ALLIED APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS. THUS, FROM THE OUTSET, THE ALLIED SIDE ADVOCATED A PHASED NEGOTIATION, THE OBJECTIVE OF WHICH WOULD BE A COMMON CEILING ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WITH FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, WITH PROVISION FOR A FURTHER PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE FOR STABILIZING, VERIFICATION, AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES. ADVERSE EFFECTS ON FLANK SECURITY MUST BE AVOIDED.

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 09894 02 OF 03 301452Z

4. THE EASTERN OPENING SPEECHES STAYED WITHIN THE LINES LAID DOWN BY SOVIET PARTY SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN HIS 26 OCTOBER SPEECH TO THE WORLD PEACE CONGRESS. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE QUOTED VERBATIM FROM THE BREZHNEV SPEECH AND OTHER EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES CITED IT. THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS CHOSE TO OMIT "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" FROM THE AGREED DESCRIPTION OF THE TALKS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SINGLE MENTION BY THE SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES. THE EASTERN SPEAKERS INTERPRETED THE INITIAL TALKS AS HAVING DEFINED THE AREA WHICH IS TO BE THE OBJECT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS: BELGIUM, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, AND THE NETHERLANDS ON THE WESTERN SIDE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GDR, AND POLAND ON THE EASTERN SIDE. THIS EMPHASIS ON AREA SEEMED INTENDED TO ESTABLISH THAT HUNGARIAN TERRITORY AND SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN FORCES THERE (AND BY IMPLICATION SOVIET TERRITORY) WERE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES FOCUSED ON WHAT IS CLEARLY THE CENTRAL CONCEPTUAL ISSUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST OVER HOW TO OBTAIN "UNDIMINISHED SECURITY". THE SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN OPENING STATEMENTS SPECIFIED THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH IS BASED ON PRESERVING THE "EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES", THE EASTERN CONTENTION BEING THAT ASSYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS WOULD WEAKEN THE EXISTING SECURITY BALANCE AND THEREFORE RESULT IN DIMINUTION OF THEIR SECURITY. THE EASTERN SPEAKERS REITERATED BREZHNEV'S FORMULATION CONCERNING FORCES TO BE REDUCED: FOREIGN AND NATIONAL, LAND AND AIR, INCLUDING "UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR ARMS".

#### INITIAL EASTERN REACTION TO WESTERN APPROACH

5. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES FOLLOWED UP THEIR OPENING SPEECHES WITH A DEVELOPMENT OF THEMES THAT THE WESTERN SIDE CONSIDERED PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT CONCEPTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, EMPHASIZING THE GOALS OF ENHANCED STABILITY AND STRENGTHENED SECURITY IN EUROPE FOR ALL. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES RESPONDED TO THESE THEMATIC STATEMENTS THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED THAT THE WEST WANTED TO HOLD A "GENERAL DEBATE" AND URGED EARLY DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS, AND TABLED A DRAFT AGREEMENT ON 8 NOVEMBER.

#### THE EASTERN PROPOSAL

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 09894 02 OF 03 301452Z

6. THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT PRESENTED ON 8 NOVEMBER CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS:

A. AREA: BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, AND POLAND.

B. STAGING AND SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS: REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN THREE STATES:

- (1) IN 1975, THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON EITHER SIDE WOULD WOULD MAKE A "SYMBOLIC"REDUCTION OF 20,000 MEN.
- (2) IN 1976, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY FIVE PERCENT.
- (3) IN 1977, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY TEN PERCENT.

C. METHOD OF REDUCTIONS: REDUCTIONS WOULD BE MADE BY SPECIFIC COMPARABLE UNITS ON BOTH SIDES; FOREIGN FORCES WOULD BE SENT HOME WITH THEIR ARMS AND EQUIPMENT, NATIONAL FORCES WOULD BE DISBANDED AND THEIR EQUIPMENT ELIMINATED FROM MILITARY USE.

D. FORCES TO BE REDUCED: AS WELL AS GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES (MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT) AND NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS.

E. ASSOCIATED MEASURES: THE PROPOSAL MAKES NO DIRECT REFERENCE TO ASSOCIATED MEASURES FOR STABILIZATION, VERIFICATION, OR NON-CIRCUMVENTION, AS UNDERSTOOD BY THE WEST. ALTHOUGH HE PROPOSAL CONTAINED NO STATEMENT ON VERIFICATION, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IN PRESENTING IT SAID VERIFICATION WOULD BE BY NATIONAL MEANS.

ALLIED RESPONSE TO EASTERN PROPOSAL

7. THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA REFREINED FROM COMMENTING SPECIFICALLY ON THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THEY DECIDED TO MAINTAIN THEIR APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, MERELY ACCELERATING THE SCHEDULE FOR THEMATIC PRESENTATIONS AND FOR THE TABLING THEIR OUTLINE PROPOSALS. THE SOVIETS PRODDERD THE WEST TO ADDRESS THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OR MAKE SPECIFIC

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 09894 03 OF 03 301442Z

53

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04

AEC-11 AECE-00 OMB-01 INRE-00 DRC-01 /149 W

----- 125893

O 301340Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 787  
SECDEF IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 9894

FROM US REP MBFR

PROPOSALS OF ITS OWN. THE EASTERN EFFORT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A INTENTIONAL LEAK TO THE PRESS ON NOVEMBER 15 OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THE LEAK WAS NOT EFFECTIVE, HOWEVER, AND RECEIVED SPARSE COVERAGE IN THE WESTERN PRESS.

ALLIED OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS

8. ON 22 NOVEMBER, FOLLOWING COUNCIL APPROVAL, THE US REPRESENTATIVE TABLED THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE PROPOSAL CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING ESSENTIALS:

A. AREA OF REDUCTIONS: BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, AND POLAND.

B. FORCES TO BE REDUCED: GROUND FORCES.

C. NEGOTIATING GOAL: ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL  
SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 09894 03 OF 03 301442Z

GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WHICH MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 SOLDIERS.

D. SCOPE AND TIMING: REDUCTIONS TO BE NEGOTIATED IN TWO SEPARATE SUCCESSIVE PHASES, WITH THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS LIMITED TO REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES.

E. COMPOSITION AND METHOD OF REDUCTIONS: USSR WOULD WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY OF 5 DIVISIONS INCLUDING ABOUT 68,000 SOLDIERS AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS, OR APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT OF TOTAL SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN AREA; US WOULD WITHDRAW ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN AREA, OR ABOUT 29,000 SOLDIERS; US SOLDIERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND EQUIPMENT COULD BE STORED AND MAINTAINED IN AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

F. OTHER SECURITY ASPECTS: IN ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES SHOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS.

G. ASSOCIATED MEASURES: MEASURES SHOULD BE AGREED TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND ENHANCE STABILITY AS WELL AS TO PROVIDE FOR APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

H. SECOND PHASE: FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING. IT SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE, THE OBJECTIVE OF WHICH WOULD BE COMPLETION OF MOVEMENT TOWARD A COMMON CEILING.

EASTERN POSTURE AND TACTICS

9. ALTHOUGH THE WARSAW PACT UNDOUBTEDLY HOPE TO INDUCE THE WEST TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PROPOSALS, THOSE PROPOSALS IN THEIR PRESENT FORM AMOUNT TO AN OPENING BID ALLOWING SOME ROOM FOR COMPROMISE. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT PRESENT TO JUDGE WHAT THE IRREDUCIBLE MINIMUM OF WARSAW PACT REQUIREMENTS WILL TURN OUT TO BE. THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE FORMAL SOVIET APPROACH APPEAR AT PRESENT TO BE:

A. TO DEFINE 'UNDIMINISHED SECURITY' IN SUCH A WAY AS TO  
SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 09894 03 OF 03 301442Z

PRECLUDE ANY ALTERATION IN THE WARSAW PACT'S EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES AND THUS MILITARY ADVANTAGES IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

B. TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT AS RELEVANT THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES ON GROUNDS THAT THE WESTERN COMPARISONS ARE TOO SELECTIVE;

C. THEREFORE TO CALL FOR A "COMPREHENSIVE" APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS, EMBRACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AIR FORCES;

D. AND THEREFORE TO INSIST THAT NATIONAL AND FOREIGN FORCES BE REDUCED SIMULTANEOUSLY.

IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHAT OBJECTIVE D. MEANS. IN SPITE OF THE APPARENTLY HARD LINE IN EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENTS, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME HINTS THAT THE EAST MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT INITIAL REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES IF THERE WERE A COMMITMENT TO SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF OTHER FORCES, ESPECIALLY THE BUNDESWEHR. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE SIZE OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA HAS BEEN COMPARED WITH THE SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR

10. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE OBJECTED STRONGLY TO THE OBJECTIVE OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES, ALTHOUGH SOME SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE IMPLIED PRIVATELY THAT APPROXIMATION OF A COMMON CEILING MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IF AIR FORCE MANPOWER WERE INCLUDED FOR COMPUTATION OF TOTAL FORCES ON EITHER SIDE. SIGNIFICANTLY, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE DECLINED TO DISCUSS MANPOWER OR FORCE DATA OBJECTIVELY (EXCEPT FOR ASSERTING THAT THE WESTERN FIGURES ARE WRONG), AND HAVE QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR AN AGREED DATA BASE FOR REDUCTIONS.

11. FROM THE OUTSET THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE URGED EARLY

CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. PRIVATELY, SOME EASTERN DELEGATES HAVE CONCEDED THAT AN EARLY AGREEMENT INCLUDING NATIONAL FORCES AND ESTABLISHING NATIONAL SUB-CEILING FOR THEM MIGHT PRE-EMPT AND INHIBIT PLANS FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION WHICH CLEARLY CONCERN THEM.

#### EVALUATION

#### 12. THE TONE OF PLENARY STATEMENTS AND THE ATMOSPHERE IN SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 09894 03 OF 03 301442Z

RELATIONS BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE SO FAR GENERALLY REMAINED BUSINESSLIKE AND UNPOLEMICAL. THE EASTERN SIDE HAS, HOWEVER, DISPLAYED SOME IRRITATION AT THE MANNER, PACE AND CONTENT OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION, AND AT WESTERN DELAY IN RESPONDING DIRECTLY TO THE EASTERN PROPOSALS.

13. THE PURPOSE OF THE EARLY TABLING OF THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TO THROW THE WEST OFF BALANCE, TO INTERRUPT THE ORDERLY WESTERN PRESENTATION OF THEMATIC MATERIAL, AND TO FORCE THE WEST TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF SOVIET PROPOSALS AND THUS OF SOVIET CONCEPTS. THE SOVIET TACTIC FAILED BECAUSE:

A. THE NATO COUNTRIES DID NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE RUSHED INTO ABANDONING THEIR CHOSEN MODE OF PRESENTING THEIR PROPOSALS;

B. THEY WERE ABLE TO MAINTAIN CREDIBLY THAT THEY WERE ALREADY DEVELOPING THEIR OWN PROPOSALS ON THE LINES LAID DOWN IN THEIR OPENING STATEMENTS; AND TO PRESENT THEIR OWN PROPOSALS WITHIN A FORTNIGHT OF THE EASTERN INITIATIVE.

C. THE WESTERN PRESS REMAINED UNIMPRESSED BY THE EASTERN PROPOSALS AND GAVE THEM LITTLE COVERAGE. THE PRESENTATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION HAS THUS GONE ACCORDING TO PLAN.

14. THE APPROACH OF THE WARSAW PACT IS NOT YET SO RIGID AS TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE. DESPITE THIS, THERE HAS BEEN NO CLEAR EXPRESSION OF FLEXIBILITY WITH REGARD TO MAJOR CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES WHICH SEPARATE THE TWO SIDES. THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IS LIKELY TO SEE EXTENSIVE PROBING BY BOTH SIDES.

15. THE WARSAW PACT HAS BEEN TRYING TO PUSH NATO INTO A RAPID PACE OF NEGOTIATION AND INTO MAKING CONCESSIONS. IN THE FACE OF THIS PRESSURE AND THE RAPID PACE OF EVENTS THE NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE FULLY MAINTAINED THEIR COHESION.  
END TEXT.HUMES



SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 12 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 30 NOV 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973VIENNA09894  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19731168/abqcelnw.tel  
**Line Count:** 434  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** boyleja  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <22-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <10-Oct-2001 by boyleja>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: AGREED AD HOC REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO  
**To:** NATO INFO STATE  
**SECDEF**  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005